Abstract: Financial markets react to major political events. The three nuclear tests conducted by North Korea in 2006Korea in , 2009Korea in and 2013 are a sober confirmation of its on-going nuclear weapons program with the concomitant potential security threat this poses for the stability of the greater region. This article examines how nine regional stock exchanges reacted to the three nuclear tests given their important security repercussions. The results, although not uniformed across all countries and markets, revealed a greater adverse effect in the case of the second of the three tests. Given that the first test was announced in advance and the third was conducted in the midst of an on-going military crisis, this finding suggests that following the initial shock an unanticipated event can cause, markets can evaluate and absorb in a more efficient manner the news.
Introduction
In 2013 tensions in the Korean peninsula escalated to very high levels involving North and South Korea as well as the USA and Japan and resulted in a probably unprecedented, in recent years, military mobilization. The 2013 Korean crisis started unfolding with a North Korean satellite launch in December 2012 that triggered a UN Security Council stern condemnation and strengthening of the sanctions imposed by previous resolutions. The retaliation of the North Korean regime included extreme bellicose rhetoric and sabre rattling that caused a state of high military alert in the South and the US to fully mobilize their military assets in the region. The nuclear test of 12 February, 2013 was probably the climax of the crisis. The military escalation of 2013 was by no means an uncommon situation for the region. It was preceded by a similarly tense situation in 2010 that also involved a large-scale military mobilization by the parties involved. In fact, although the July 1953 armistice brought an end to the Korean War (1950) (1951) (1952) (1953) , the area has ever since been continuously characterized by friction and tension between the North and the South. Bellicose rhetoric, saber rattling, artillery exchanges, incursions, skirmishes and armed engagements along the 38th parallel and the buffer zone established after the cessation of hostilities, have invariable been the order of the day despite lulls of reapprochement and improvements in the relations not only between North and South Korea but also between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and other global or regional players such as the US and Japan.
Given the history of the division of the Korean peninsula and the attributes of the North Korean regime, the military dimension is an omnipresent factor that shapes relations and events in the area (Bae 2004; Han 2005; Smith 2006; Wintrobe 2013) despite the conflict resolution efforts that have been endeavored (inter alia: Isard and Azis 1999; Isard and Chung 2000; Isard and Han 2008) . Although such conflict resolution efforts have yielded results, Bae (2004) points out that the rather appreciable headway made in areas such as the economic relations between the two Koreas, has never lifted the threat of a full scale armed confrontation with the South fearing a surprise pre-emptive attack by the North Korean regime. In fact, North Korea has constantly presented its neighbors in the region as well as the West in general, with a major political and military challenge. The DPRK's nuclear aspirations have always been a major source of security risk for the region (Han 2005; Smith 2006 ). The three nuclear tests of 9th October 2006 , 25th May 2009 , and 12th February 2013 are a sober confirmation of the North's nuclear capacity. Although by no means technologically comparable to the West's nuclear arsenal, the mere fact that the North Korean regime has a proven crude nuclear capability that could potentially use it, adds a qualitatively different dimension in the security equation of the region.
Major political events, such as the three nuclear tests conducted by North Korea, have the potential to affect markets through investors' sentiment and risk premia. In turn, this can increase volatility with the concomitant effects on asset valuation, investment decisions and portfolio allocation. In this context, the paper sets out to examine how markets in the region reacted to the three tests that confirmed North Korea's nuclear capability and hence affected the strategic and security environment of the region. The market indices examined here are: Shanghai Composite (China), Hang Seng (Hong Kong), Bombay Sensex (India), Nikkei 225 (Japan), Kospi Composite (S. Korea), Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia), PSE Composite (Philippines), Straits Times (Singapore), Taiwan Weighted (Taiwan). In the next section we proceed with an epigrammatic review of the literature and the accumulated empirical evidence briefly discussing the attributes of the three tests while in Section 3 the empirical methodology employed is outlined and the data presented. The results are shown and discussed in Section 4, while Section 5 concludes the paper.
Political events and markets
The reaction of markets to security events and political developments, including war, military tension, civil strife, terrorism, or indeed catastrophic events such as nuclear accidents (for instance Chernobyl or Fukushima), is an issue that has attracted growing attention in the relevant literature (inter alia: Amihud and Wohl 2004; Athanassiou, Kollias, and Syriopoulos 2006; Chen 1984; Choudhry 1995 Choudhry , 2010 Fields and Janjigian 1989; Guidolin and La Ferrara 2010; Kawashima and Takeda 2012; Kollias, Papadamou, and Stagiannis 2010; Rigobon and Sack 2005; Schneider and Troeger 2006; Shoham et al. 2011) . As, among others, Kucher (2000, 2001) stress, markets invariably echo and reverberate important political events and incidents such as the ones examined here. Political and economic news, elections, policy shifts, political instability, coups, intra and interstate conflict, terrorist attacks can affect market agents' asset valuations, market and country risk perceptions, investors' sentiment and portfolio allocation decisions (inter alia: Asteriou and Siriopoulos 2003; Bali and Cakici 2010; Bilson, Brailsford, and Hooper 2002; Chesney, Reshetar, and Karaman 2011; Drakos 2010; Enders, Sachsida, and Sandler 2006; Hicks and Smith 2009; Kollias, Papadamou, and Arvanitis 2013; Perotti and van Oijen 2001; Shoham et al. 2011; Wisniewski 2009 ). Similar events in the past and in particular the nuclear tests conducted by India and Pakistan in 1998 brought about a significant negative effect on capital flows and stock markets as well as economic sanctions by the USA that further amplified markets' negative reaction (Morrow and Carriere 1999) . Bialkowski, Gottschalk, and Wisniewski (2008) note that markets can be unsettled by important political events and changes due to the risk and uncertainty they may potentially represent. In particular, rare events such as the three North Korean nuclear tests examined here, affect or have the potential to affect the political risk component of portfolio allocation decisions. As Bilson, Brailsford, and Hooper (2002) point out, the concept of political risk is quite broad, multidimensional and difficult to quantify. Nevertheless, the risk stemming from political acts and actions by governments or state agents can affect or threaten the expected returns on investment or the reverse, i.e., improve investment prospects and opportunities and hence positively affect stock markets (Perotti and van Oijen 2001; Wisniewski 2009) .
Given the global nature of financial markets and the contagion potential this entails (Azis, Mitra, and Baluga 2013) , an increase in the risk emanating from the actions (or expected actions) of a government or state can bring about noteworthy changes and shifts in equity markets, in the cross country correlation of assets, in portfolio allocation and diversification. Such risks are particularly present in developing areas of the world where states are, in comparative terms, more prone to political instability, or, as in our case, in regions where regional security and stability may be threatened by bilateral friction and tension between regional rivals or the unilateral actions of a rogue state; in this case the North Korean regime. Tension, conflict and war impact markets and affect asset prices albeit such effects may not be uniform across financial markets, countries and through time. A cohort of factors such as the severity of the event, its expected duration and outcome, whether or not it was anticipated by agents in the markets, may be cited as possible determinants of the net impact that political events exert on markets (Rigobon and Sack 2005; Schneider and Troeger 2006) . For example, although the threat of terrorism is to some extent omnipresent, terrorist attacks are unannounced and unexpected when they actually occur. Thus, they can act as exogenous shocks to markets. As Arin, Ciferri, and Spagnolo (2008) observe, investors can hedge against expected events but not so when it comes to events such as a terrorist attack. On the other hand, Amihud and Wohl (2004) have argued that, whenever major events such as a war are preceded by strong expectations for their occurrence, for instance an official announcement of firm intention and commitment, markets will invariably tend to incorporate this information in the prices before such events actually take place. Studies have also shown that, as political events, for instance an armed conflict or war, unfold; market agents will adjust their position depending on the anticipated result of the conflict as this is determined by various incidents during the military operations that can affect the course and the final outcome of the fighting. For example, in the case of the [2008] [2009] Israeli military offensive in the Gaza strip, Kollias, Papadamou, and Stagiannis (2010) report findings that point to a changing behavior by market participants in the Tel Aviv stock exchange as the offensive unfolded and the probability of a successful conclusion both in military and political terms increased. Kucher (2000, 2001 ) find evidence indicating that major events that shaped the course of World War II have left an identifiable imprint on bond markets. Similar findings for World War II events that are historically considered as important turning points are reported by Choudhry (2010) . Results by Amihud and Wohl (2004) also show that markets, during the second Gulf War, adjusted their behavior to the probability of Saddam's fall from power and hence the final outcome of the war.
Within the broader context and spirit of the aforementioned studies and findings, the three nuclear tests conducted by the North Korean regime, added a further risk dimension in the security equation of the region and the concomitant risk profile of the area. As already noted earlier, the fact that North Korea was for some years pursuing a nuclear military capability was well known. The North's withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in March 1993 and the nuclear crisis that ensued may be considered as the formal announcement, urbi et orbi, of the beginning of the North's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. The signing of the Agreed Framework in October 1994 between DPRK and the USA ended the crisis at the time but not the North's nuclear efforts. The three tests on the 9th October 2006 , 25th May 2009 , and 12th February 2013 are in a sense proof of the successful culmination of these efforts and testify to the North's accession and membership to the club of countries that possess nuclear weapons. The now proven crude nuclear capability of DPRK, adds a qualitatively different dimension in the security equation of the region given the characteristics and aggressive behavior of the North Korean regime. Perhaps, before we proceed with the empirical examination of how markets in the region reacted to the events in question, it is worth mentioning a significant difference between the three tests that will be incorporated in the empirical investigation that follows. The first of the tests, i.e., the one that took place on the 9th October 2006 was announced in advance by North Korea. The official announcement was made a few days earlier on October, 3rd. Hence, it was an expected incident when it actually occurred. The second test, roughly 3 years later on 25th May 2009, was not announced in advance. Thus, from the markets' viewpoint it was an unforeseen external shock given its serious security repercussions. The third test that of February 12, 2013, was also not announced but, on the other hand was an integral part of an ongoing highly tense security situation with a military showdown already unfolding since all the players involved had fully mobilized their military assets and cocked their weapons.
Data and methodology
Our sample consists of daily stock market data from the stock exchanges of nine countries in the region: Japan, Hong Kong, S. Korea, China, Taiwan, Singapore, India, Philippines and Malaysia. The time period ranges from 01/01/1998 to 03/07/2013 and includes the three nuclear tests in question: 9/10/2006, 25/5/2009, and 12/02/2013. As already pointed out, the first was announced in advanced (3/10/2006). Given this important difference, for the purposes of our analysis the date of the official announcement is taken to be the event day since it is then that all agents involved were informed of the North's intention to conduct a nuclear test that was proof of the nuclear capability now possessed by the DPRK. In the context of the efficient markets hypothesis, one expects that the news, once available, were incorporated by market agents. This clearly is not the case for the 2009 test that was unannounced and hence unforeseen. Thus, the actual day it took place is taken as the event date. An interesting byproduct of the analysis that follows will be to see whether market reaction differed in the case of the May 25, 2009 test, i.e., the unannounced, vis-à-vis the announced nuclear test. Less clear-cut is the case of the third test. On the one hand it was not announced in advance by North Korea. On the other hand, as already pointed out, it can be treated as an integral part of a solemn military showdown that started unfolding a few weeks earlier. Hence, from this angle, it is possible that market agents had already adjusted to the existing grave security situation with the potential threats and perils it represented.
In line with previous studies (inter allia: Arin, Ciferri, and Spagnolo 2008; Borenstein and Zimmerman 1988; Bosch, Eckard, and Singal 1998; Chance and Ferris 1987; Chen and Siems 2004; Shoham et al. 2011; Kollias, Papadamou, and Arvanitis 2013; Kollias, Papadamou, and Stagiannis 2010) we assume that any market reaction to the event starts on the first day after the event itself. Thus, in order to test the significance of the reversal effect, we examine the first three trading days after each of the three nuclear test or of the announcement date in the case of the first.
As first step in our methodology, event study analysis is used. Specifically, the daily excess returns for the general indices were measured by the mean-adjustedreturns approach (MacKinley 1997) . That is, for each day at, and following, each event, we computed:
where AR t is the abnormal return for the stock index at time t, R t is the actual observed rate of return for this index, and R is the mean of this index's daily returns in the (−30,−11) estimation period. Given that the event date is at t = 0, and following Chen and Siems (2004) , the mean-adjusted-returns model is estimated over 20 days, from t = −30 to t = −11. Additionally two longer event windows were examined by computing the cumulative average abnormal returns (CARs) two (t = 2) and 5 days (t = 5) following the event. The cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) were estimated as follows:
where t 1 is the first day after the announcement and t 2 is consequently 2 and 5 days after the event.
However, one of the drawbacks of the event study analysis is that the estimation of abnormal returns is based on the estimation window before the event window. The length of this window is invariably selected in an ad-hock manner. Furthermore, other significant variables, that cannot be accounted for by an event-study methodology, may also affect stock markets. Hence, the second step of our analysis is based on an asset pricing model. To test the null hypothesis and to estimate the impact that the three events had on stock returns, we adopt a similar methodology used in previous event studies (inter allia: Warner 1980, 1985; Kamstra, Kramer, and Levi 2003; Kaplanski and Levy 2010) . Assuming that investors do not hedge against exchange rate risk, the conditional version of the world CAPM augmented for several known anomalies in financial markets implies the following behavior for returns:
where R t is the daily rate of return on the relevant stock price index, 1 γ 0 is the regression intercept. In order to account for any possible serial correlation, since previous studies have found a weak tendency for movements in aggregate US stock returns to persist (see for example Schwert 1990a,b), R t-i is the ith previous day rate of return included in the model. We look at as many past returns as are necessary to guarantee that all significant serial correlations have been accounted for. RW t denotes the return on World Market Portfolio proxied by Stoxx Global 1800 index that consists of 600 stocks from Europe, 600 stocks from USA and 600 from Asian markets.
2 The actual empirical specification we used is rather more flexible, allowing not only for contemporaneous sensitivity but also for a dynamic relationship between R t and RW t where lagged values of order one of the latter will be included in order to capture time lags between Asian and rest of the world markets. We also allow for the "weekend effect" or "Monday effect" (inter allia: Cho et al. 2007; French 1980; Schwert 1990a) . Since this may bias the regression results dummy variables D i , i = 1,. . .,4, are included in the estimations. Moreover, we add a dummy variable for the first 5 days of the taxation year (Tax t ) in order to capture any January effect (see for instance Dyl and Maberly 1992; Keim 1983 ). The DN j,i ( j = 1,2,3 and i = 1; 2; 3) stands for possible effect and reversal effect variables for the days after the three nuclear tests ( j = 1 corresponds to 03/10/2006, j = 2 to 25/5/2009, and j = 3 to 12/02/2013). Furthermore, given the significance of the Lehman Brothers default announcement on the world economy we also included relevant dummy variables for the days related to the event announcement and 1 day after to allow for the time lag between Asian and rest of the world markets. Since we are dealing with daily returns on consecutive days, it was felt that we must control for known anomalies to ensure they do not contaminate the results. Based on equation (3) estimated parameters, the main research questions tested here can be summarized as follows: H 1 . We first test the joint hypothesis of both the event effect and the reversal effect asserting that there is a below average rate of return (γ 5,j,1 < 0) on the first day after the event (or the announcement of the event) and an above average rate of return (γ 5,j,2 > 0) on the reversal day immediately afterwards. H 2 . Given the North-South tension, does the South Korean stock exchange present the larger -in absolute terms -event day coefficient vis-à-vis other the stock markets examined here? H 3 . Does geographic proximity determine the magnitude and the persistence of any effect? H 4 . Was there any significant observable difference in how small and large capitalization markets reacted? H 5 . Did the reaction differ in the case of the announced nuclear test vis-à-vis the two unannounced?
To allow for the possibility that a few extreme observations affect the results, we estimate a quantile regression (QR), introduced by Koenker and Bassett (1978) . Quantile regressions are not as sensitive to extreme observations as the typical OLS regression can be (see for instance Koenker and Hallock 2001; Portnoy and Koenker 1997) . Thus, instead of estimating the conditional mean via the OLS method, the QR method is employed to estimate conditional median. Finally, in order to take into account a possible conditional heteroskedasticity, we also assume time-varying volatility and employ a Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity GARCH(1,1) model (Bollerslev 1986; Engle 1982) . These two additional steps in our empirical methodology may be viewed as robustness checks.
In Table 1 the descriptive statistics for the return series of the national stock indices are presented as well the world index. The data are drawn from Reuters EcoWin and Stoxx databases, respectively. As can be seen the daily mean return in the markets is zero, while China presents the highest in absolute terms maximum and minimum values. Singapore presents the smaller risk as measured by the standard deviation of the returns.
The results of the event study analysis are presented in Table 2 . They show that only the markets of South Korea and India exhibit a statistically significant negative reaction to the first two nuclear tests. Nevertheless, these effects are short lived. In case of the first nuclear test small capitalization markets such as those in Malaysia and the Philippines also exhibit a negative and statistically significant reaction.
The empirical findings of the estimations of equation (3) are presented in Tables 3 and 4a Table 3 . We start with the first of the three nuclear tests that is the one that took place on the 9th October 2006 but was announced in advance on 3rd October; the latter being the date taken as the event date in the relevant tests as already pointed out. As it can be seen from Table 3 , with the exception of the stock indices of Hong Kong and Singapore, the first day coefficient is negative and statistically significant in all the other cases. Moreover, consistent with our hypothesis, from the six negatively affected markets, the South Korean KOSPI index presents the larger in absolute terms coefficient (-1.83). The second day coefficient is positive and statistical significant in the case of India, Japan, Taiwan and the Philippines. In all these cases the first day negative effect is apparently offset by the second day reversal effect, suggesting only a short term impact of the first nuclear test on these stock markets. Again, as one would intuitively expect, the notable exception is the Korean market where reversal effect is not immediate.
Turning to impact of the second and unannounced North Korean nuclear test (25/5/2009), it appears that the negative effect is more significant in case of India and South Korea. Also, the stock market in Singapore presents a negative and statistically significant first day reaction compared to the no reaction finding in the case of announced first test. In the case of the Nikkei-225 index, the rebound takes more than 1 day compared to Taiwan, Philippines, India and China where markets rebounded in 1 day (Table 3 ). An interesting observation is that the reaction of the markets in question to the Lehman Brothers default announcement is greater in absolute terms. It would appear that adverse financial news yield a greater reaction compared to the impact major political incidents such as the three nuclear tests have. We now move to discuss the findings for the third nuclear test (12/02/2013) that was also not previously announced but, as already pointed out it was conducted in the midst of an already grave military crisis that had been smouldering since mid-December 2012. This difference, vis-à-vis the other unannounced test of May 25, 2009, probably explains why the findings show an appreciable weaker market reaction in absolute terms albeit negative and significant (Table 3 ). This suggests that markets had already incorporated and adjusted to the on-going severe crisis. Thus, although the test triggers an empirically traceable market reaction, this is not as pronounced as in the case of the second one. In a sense, the nuclear test was another incident -albeit a very serious one -of an unfolding dangerous situation.
An inspection of the results corresponding to the various control variables (i.e., the world market index, serial correlation, the day of the week effect and tax effects) reveals the following: (a) The coefficient of the world market index is statistically significant in all stock markets. However, in some of them the lag variable of the world market index has a stronger effect on the markets studied a finding that can probably be attributed to non-synchronous trading among Asian markets and the rest of the world. (b) The serial correlation coefficients are significant mostly in the one period lag for the majority of the indices. In the case of Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and China the coefficient γ 2,1 is negative and statistically significant while for lower capitalized markets this coefficient is statistically insignificant (the exception being the Philippines). Moreover, in some cases, statistically significant coefficients are found on period lags two, three and four (see Table 4a and b). When it comes to the week day dummies, the Monday coefficient, that is negative and statistically significant in the case of Singapore and Taiwan, becomes less significant when the heteroskedasticity effect and extreme values are taken into account. Finally, on the basis of the results reported in Tables 3 and 4a ,b, there is some evidence that the Tuesday coefficient is negative and statistically significant, in cases of Philippines, Malaysia and Taiwan.
The results reported in Tables 4a,b , where the QR and a GARCH model are employed, show that the findings concerning the effects of the three nuclear tests remaining intact. This strongly suggests that the results reported in Table 3 are not spurious. For the first day after the event (or the announcement of it in the case of the first) the coefficient is negative and statistically significant in almost all of the cases just as in Table 3 . A stronger effect is found to be the case for the stock markets of Korea, India and Singapore. In the case of Japan the rebound of 11.7%
32.1%
17.6%
F-statistic (p-value) (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** (0.00)*** Notes: *** , ** , *Statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% level; p-value of z-statistics in parentheses (·). For the GARCH model estimation, since the innovations appear leptokurtic rather than normally distributed, quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) covariances and robust standard errors have been used (see Bollerslev, Wooldridge, 1992) . (Table   4a : Continued)
The Financial Fallout of North Korean Nuclear Tests 285 the innovations appear leptokurtic rather than normally distributed, quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) covariances and robust standard errors have been used (see Bollerslev, Wooldridge, 1992) . (Table the Nikkei index is achieved in 2 days rather than in one. In line with the previous findings, for the third nuclear test the results are again weaker.
In order to enable more general inferences to be drawn we grouped our main findings in Table 5 . The following information is provided therein: market capitalization, distance from North Korea (measured as the distance between the respective capital cities) and whether or not the country has a history of conducting nuclear tests in the past. One would have intuitively expected that the stock markets of countries nearer to North Korea would have exhibited the greater reaction to the nuclear tests. Our results did not appear to support such an intuition with the obvious exception of the South Korean Kospi Composite index. A finding that clearly does not warrant any further analysis and discussion. For the other markets, it is not proximity but rather capitalization that appears to determine the magnitude of the negative reaction as the case of Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur index) and the Philippines (PSE Composite) seem to suggest on the basis of the event study and regression results reported earlier. Interestingly enough, this was the case only for the first nuclear test in 2006 which may be cautiously interpreted as an indication of market efficiency, i.e., that the possibility of further nuclear tests was discounted in advance by market agents following the first one. Perhaps, a further noteworthy finding that the empirical analysis seems to have unearthed is the significantly negative reaction of the Indian stock market (Bombay Sensex). In fact, it was found to be the second more sensitive in terms of reaction market after the South Korean one. Clearly, geographic proximity cannot be cited as an explanatory factor. A tentatively and hesitant explanation for this finding may be the fact that India itself has in the past conducted nuclear tests that caused a significant negative effect on capital flows and stock markets and triggered US economic sanctions that further augmented markets' Table 5 : Market capitalization; history of nuclear tests; distances from North Korea.
Country
Distance from North Korea (km)
Market capitalization in millions $ (Average 2003-2012)
History of previous nuclear tests negative reaction as reported by Morrow and Carriere (1999) . Finally, in the case of the Japanese market (the Nikkei 225 index), it is interesting to compare our findings here to those of Kawashima and Takeda (2012) that examine the effects of the Fukushima nuclear accident. On the whole, it appears that the latter event caused an appreciably greater upset in the Japanese markets vis-à-vis the nuclear tests of our study. A cautious explanation may be sought in the rather prolonged uncertainty of the true magnitude and consequences that followed the nuclear accident and the structural and regulatory changes that it generated as well as the shift in societal attitudes and stance towards nuclear energy and hence production costs.
Concluding remarks
As studies have shown financial markets react to major political events such as military tension, armed conflict, civil strife, terrorism. The three nuclear tests conducted by the North Korea regime are a sober confirmation of its nuclear weapon capacity with the concomitant potential security threat this poses for the stability of the greater region given the often quite aggressive military behavior of the DPRK. This paper set out to examine how nine stock exchanges in the region reacted to the three tests. The results, although not uniformed across all countries and markets, revealed a greater adverse effect in the case of the second of the three tests. The qualitative difference between the three events being that the first was announced whereas the second was unexpected. This seems to suggest that the prior announcement provided ample time for markets to evaluate and absorb in a more efficient manner the news whereas the unannounced second nuclear test was more of an exogenous shock that markets did not expect and hence rattled them more. The impact of the third test was found weaker, although it was also not announced. The crisis in the midst of which it was conducted, offers a plausible explanation for this weaker effect. As one would intuitively have expected, of the nine countries and markets examined here, the most affected was South Korea. This of course is by no means a surprising finding given that South Korea is the front-line country faced with the direct security risk the DPRK represents and has on a regular basis been at the receiving end of the North's military aggressiveness.
